Zimbabwe’s GBV Response Is 90% Donor-Funded says Gender Commission

By Jonathan Mbiriyamveka

HARARE — Zimbabwe’s national response to gender-based violence is currently around 90 percent donor-funded, according to the Zimbabwe Gender Commission, which has identified the shift toward domestic financing as a central goal of the country’s High Level Political Compact.

The disclosure appears in a statement by Commission Chairperson Dr Leslie Ncube announcing a 90-day National Campaign Against Intimate Partner Violence, running from October to December 2026.

The figure is not presented as a new crisis, but as a structural condition the country has committed to changing.

The statement references Zimbabwe’s High Level Political Compact to End Gender-Based Violence and Harmful Practices 2021–2030, launched by President Emmerson Mnangagwa in 2021, and the linked National Strategy to Prevent and Address GBV 2023–2030.

Among the compact’s stated targets is a “reallocating national budget responsibility” goal — explicitly framed as achieving “structural and financial sustainability.”

The compact, according to the Gender Commission, “outlines targets to move away from a 90% heavy donor-funded GBV model to progressively higher domestic financing allocations via gender-responsive budgeting.”

The admission is significant for two reasons. First, it confirms that the national GBV response — including prevention programmes, survivor support services, shelters and referral mechanisms — depends overwhelmingly on external funding. Second, it establishes that the government has formally committed to reducing that dependency.

Whether that commitment has translated into budget allocations is a separate question the statement does not answer.

A 90 percent donor-funded model creates a specific set of vulnerabilities.

Programmes funded by external donors are subject to donor priorities, reporting requirements and funding cycles. When donor funding shifts — whether due to changing global priorities, economic conditions in donor countries, or political considerations — services can contract or close with little notice.

For survivors, that translates into uncertainty. A shelter that depends on a donor grant may not be able to guarantee capacity next year.

A referral hotline funded by a foreign partner may operate for a fixed project period rather than indefinitely. A prevention programme in a rural district may end when the grant cycle closes.

Domestic financing, by contrast, is subject to parliamentary appropriation and can be sustained across political transitions — in principle. It is also more accountable to Zimbabwean taxpayers, who have a direct interest in how public funds are used.

The Commission’s framing — “structural and financial sustainability” — acknowledges that a response built on external funding is not, by definition, sustainable.

The compact also sets a prevalence target: a minimum 20 to 30 percent absolute reduction in the overall national prevalence of all forms of gender-based and intimate partner violence by 2030.

That target is measurable, which makes it testable. Zimbabwe is now roughly halfway through the 2021–2030 compact window.

Whether public reporting exists against the benchmark — and whether prevalence has moved at all — is not addressed in the Gender Commission‘s statement.

What the statement does confirm is that the problem remains widespread. The Commission cites ZDHS 2023–2024 data showing that 27 percent of women aged 15 to 49 have experienced physical violence and nine percent have experienced sexual violence in their lifetime.

It also cites at least 13,838 recorded cases of sexual offences and aggravated domestic violence in 2024.

If the baseline was established in 2021, those figures provide a reference point for measuring progress — or the absence of it.

The new 90-day campaign is described as a “national, multi-stakeholder initiative bringing together Government, civil society, development partners, the private sector, communities, media, faith-based and traditional leaders.”

The inclusion of development partners in that list suggests external funding remains part of the campaign’s architecture — at least in the short term.

The Gender Commission does not disclose the campaign’s budget, its funding sources, or how the 90-day programme relates to the longer-term financing goals of the compact.

That is the gap between the announcement and the objective. A campaign can be launched with donor support; a sustainable national response cannot be built on it indefinitely.

The Commission’s statement calls on Government institutions and service providers to “strengthen prevention, protection, referral and justice mechanisms,” and on civil society and development partners to “continue supporting national efforts.”

It does not call on Treasury to increase domestic allocations — at least not explicitly.

That omission is notable, given that the compact’s own targets include moving away from donor dependency.

The Commission has named the problem and cited the commitment to fix it. Whether the 2027 national budget reflects that commitment will be the first real test.

“A peaceful home creates a safer family,” the statement concludes. “Safer families create safer communities. Safer communities contribute to a stronger and more prosperous Zimbabwe.”

Whether that vision is funded domestically — or continues to depend on donors — remains to be seen.

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